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Abstract 
The paper asserts the enduring significance of ‘sovereigntist’ thinking not just at the 
rhetorical surface of EU discourse, but as a deep organizing theme of its constitutional 
politics. It argues that the ‘sovereignty surplus’ of the EU—referring to the excess and 
overlapping quality of claims to sovereignty in the EU (i.e. that ultimate authority is 
claimed both for the supranational centre and for the member states) and to the 
competition over scarce legal, political and cultural capital that arise from the 
simultaneous pursuit of these claims—underscores the notorious ‘democratic deficit’ 
of the EU in three ways. The sovereignty surplus is, first of all, the deep cause of the 
democratic deficit, in that competition over sovereignty’s scarce symbolic and 
organizational capital frustrates the development of EU-wide democracy. Secondly, 
the very gravity and divisiveness of what is at stake for the various parties involved 
and for the positions implicated in the ‘sovereignty surplus’ renders the question of 
the proper diagnosis and treatment of the ensuing democratic deficit highly 
controversial and, indeed, sharply polarised. Thirdly and finally, and bringing us back 
to the recent controversy over the aborted EU Constitution, the sovereignty surplus 
also makes the question of praxis—of how to secure the very ground of initiative 
necessary to develop and act on a more inclusively resolved diagnosis and treatment 
of the democratic deficit—whatever that may be, difficult if not intractable. The paper 
concludes by arguing for the importance of keeping that last question on the legal and 
political agenda, even—indeed especially—in an age of constitutional fatigue. 
 
Keywords 
Sovereignty, constitutionalism, democratic deficit, EU, member states. 
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Surface and Depth: The EU’s Resilient Sovereignty Question 
 
1. The Surfaces of Sovereignty 
 
In its modern guise the idea of sovereignty refers to a politically accomplished and legally 
recognized coincidence of people, territory and authority (Jellenik 1895). Its paradigm case 
has been the modern state, and indeed the modern system of states. Often described as the 
Westphalian system, the system of states in based upon a notion of mutual exclusivity—that 
each coincidence of people, territory and authority creates a holistic and self-contained unit 
whose sovereignty within its exclusive domain is respected by all other sovereign powers, 
just as, reciprocally, it respects the exclusive domain of these other sovereign powers. 
Sovereignty, of course, has always been a highly stylized idea. The entire history of 
imperialism in its early colonial guise stands as a rebuke to sovereignty’s claimed generality 
of application (Tully, 2008). And in countless ways the modern history of international 
relations, with its manifold asymmetrical power relations between states based upon 
inequalities of economic, military, political and legal capital, has continued to challenge the 
sovereignty perspective (Krasner, 1999). Yet in an important sense sovereignty has remained 
the premise of fundamental authority “that anchors our concept of modern politics.” 
(Jackson, 1999). It has done so on account of its key position as a framing category, and often 
an active “speech act” (Werner and De Wilde, 2001), utilized by key political and legal actors 
as a way of making sense of and arranging the world. That is to say, sovereignty and 
sovereignty-talk has been vital both epistemically—for the ideas it “condenses” (Turner, 
1974) and the particular way of knowing the world it supplies, and also symbolically and 
systemically—for the sense of order it represents and reproduces.1 On the one hand, 
sovereignty offers a form of shorthand for, and a convergent influence upon, a whole series 
of ideas, assumptions and expectation associated with statehood, publicness, collective 
action, identity, belonging, land, power, legitimate coercion, law and constitutionalism. And 
on the other hand, its very invocation—both the acting of legal and political players ‘as if’ 
sovereignty were the foundation of all authority and the expressive power attendant upon the 
articulation of sovereignty—have had many real and self-fulfilling consequences for the 
world, engendering a path-dependency in which those legal and political forces and relations 
that serve to renew the existing Westphalian frame are supported by the existing 
                                                 
1 On the epistemic, symbolic and systemic dimensions of sovereignty, see Walker (2008b). 
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configuration of authority and those that serve not to do so instead encounter resistance from 
that existing configuration. In many respects, however, the EU over its first half-century has 
posed a sharper set of questions about the endurance of the sovereignty frame than any other 
contemporary development. In the European supranational theatre sovereignty has been 
turned on itself, so to speak. In the register of legal discourse in particular, on the basis not 
only of the key Treaty texts of the Union but also of the pioneering early case-law of the 
European Court of Justice,2 ideas associated with sovereignty have played a large part in the 
challenge of the supranational order to the traditional authority of the state. The concepts of 
supremacy and primacy through which the authority of the supranational centre has been 
underwritten have been treated by many—both insiders and observers—as placeholders for 
or functional equivalents to a new supranational claim to sovereignty, backed up by 
supporting legal doctrines of direct effect, pre-emption, implied powers and Community-
based fundamental rights (see e.g., de Witte 1999, de Búrca 2003). In the register of politics 
(both popular and academic) too, the remorselessly increasing range and depth of the powers 
of the European Union, dramatized in recent years not just by the pushing out of the 
economic and social agenda but also by the EU’s gradual encroachment on the traditional 
state-sovereigntist concerns of currency and internal and external security, have encouraged a 
strong sense of the erosion of state sovereignty and its replacement by a new multi-level 
power configuration (see e.g. Werner and de Wilde 2001, Cederman 2001, Marks et al 1996). 
We shall have more to say about the terms of this supranational offensive in due 
course. Before we do so, however, we must anticipate an objection. This holds that the very 
success of the EU in challenging the state sovereignty paradigm raises an acute question 
about its ongoing relevance. If the EU in its developed state has so decisively cut itself off 
from the state-centred Westphalian moorings of the original Treaties of Paris (1951) and 
Rome (1957), perhaps there is little of value to be gained in continuing to draw upon the 
language of sovereignty to make sense of the most audacious postnational experiment of our 
contemporary age in its mature 21st century phase. This, indeed, is what the increasingly 
prevalent language of European “post-sovereignty” (See e.g. MacCormick, 1999, 2004; 
Bellamy 2003: Keating 2003; Menendez and Fossum, 2008) suggests. Just as, 20 years on, it 
might be considered to be a mere explanatory point of departure rather than one of arrival to 
describe the pre-1989 Warsaw Pact countries of Central and Eastern Europe as post-
Communist, the message of the European post-sovereigntists is that sovereignty today 
                                                 
2 In particular; Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR1; Case 
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remains important only as a mark of what the EU has left behind and not as a sign of where it 
now is or what it is moving towards. That is to say, the characterization of the EU in terms of 
sovereignty is one which remains significant in identifying an absence—in explaining what 
the entity is not like and how it no longer works, but one that has little or nothing positive to 
offer in identifying an alternative steering mechanism and explanatory key. 
In turn, the debate about the resilient significance of sovereignty is closely connected 
to a broader discussion about the appropriate conceptual tools for making sense of the EU 
and its prospects. For there is clear meta-theoretical water between those who, in pursuit of 
this task, would continue to use the old state-centred concepts of political modernity, and 
those who would seek a new language for what they understand to be a quite sui generic 
phenomenon (see e.g. Shaw and Wiener 2000, Friese and Wagner 2002, Walker 2005). And 
as the foundation stone of the modernist state-centred approach, sovereignty would appear to 
be first in the firing-line for those who favour jettisoning the old. On this sceptical view, in 
summary, continuing preoccupation with the idea of sovereignty in the context of the EU is 
seen as no longer anything more than a merely superficial attraction, and therefore ultimately 
as something of a distraction. For sure, sovereignty continues to figure at the rhetorical 
surface of pronouncement and debate, often indeed prominent in official discourse, but 
arguably this sovereignty-talk is now so far behind the curve of objective development that it 
distorts more than it enlightens. Such a charge finds a most obvious target in legal discourse, 
and in the way in which the sharply opposing perspectives of some legal Europeanists and 
some legal nationalists find their basis in a common preoccupation with the language or 
guiding assumptions of sovereignty. Just as European lawyers have been quick—arguably 
too quick—to see the signs of a new mode and site of sovereignty in the self-assertiveness of 
the ECJ and other institutions, so successive generations of national constitutional lawyers, it 
seems, have remained in thrall to the question of national sovereignty, and in particular to 
how the constitutional integrity of that idea may be reconciled with the aggressive 
supranational encroachments of EU law. From the clash between national and supranational 
visions of fundamental right in the 1970s, through concerns about the loss of statehood after 
the significant increase in supranational powers precipitated by the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1992 (Claes 2005) and the particular sovereignty-anxieties of the EU-acceding states of 
Central and Eastern Europe with still vivid memories of the Warsaw Pact in the early years of 
the new century (Sadurski, 2008), to the renewed concerns with central overreach triggered 
                                                                                                                                                       
6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
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by the (abortive) Constitutional Treaty of 2005 and continued in the form of its replacement 
Lisbon Treaty,3 the spectre of ‘sovereignty lost’ has periodically resurfaced in national 
constitutional courts. But while this plays well to those themes of constitutional autonomy 
which emerged as such an integral part of the modern state complex and remains well suited 
to the juridical defence of the integrity of statehood, do state sovereigntist concerns not seem 
anachronistic when considered apart from that inherently conservative discursive context? 
Has legal-constitutional discourse not retained the form of absolute sovereignty long after it 
substance has escaped? And is this not also true of all those other rhetorical surfaces—
including recent referenda debates over the failed Constitutional Treaty and the (eventually) 
successful successor Lisbon Treaty (Hobolt, 2009) and stylized national party political 
positions and oppositions over the quality, extent and limits of integration more generally, 
where the past-evocative language of sovereignty continues to sound loudly? 
 
2. Sovereignty Surplus and Democratic Deficit 
 
In what follows I try to provide an answer to this kind of scepticism. My argument is 
that the surface concern with sovereignty in legal and other discourse is not merely 
superficial, but continues to reflect certain deep structural features of the EU. In that respect, 
the power of the S-word is as resiliently important in the EU as it has been and in continues 
to be in countless other contexts of late political modernity in securing and expressing the 
latent power both of the state itself and of state-associated ideas. It serves both to frame and 
articulate certain concerns associated with the specific legal and political pedigree as well as 
the broader “social imaginary” (Taylor, 2004) of the state, and to ensure that such concerns 
feed into the ongoing institutional and ideational concerns of the EU. On the one hand, the 
role of sovereignty in this regard has been and continues to be a challenging one, sometimes 
even a destabilizing one, for the EU, posing more problems than it offers answers to the most 
developed supranational polity on the planet. On the other hand, just because of its 
expressive importance and organizing power, the concept of sovereignty must nevertheless 
figure in any solutions that are sought to the EU’s ongoing efforts to establish and sustain 
itself as a viable political community. In brief, the case for the resilient centrality of the 
                                                 
3 This idea of an ultimately ‘zero-sum’ relationship between German sovereignty and the development of the 
EU polity is a prevalent theme in the German Constitutional Court’s 2009 (affirmative) decision on the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08,30 June 2009, available at: 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html. See also D. 
Halberstam and C. Möllers (2009). 
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sovereignty problématique rests upon the argument that what we might term the longstanding 
‘sovereignty surplus’ of the EU is closely and profoundly connected to the theme that lies at 
the resilient centre of the debate over the legitimacy of the EU. If, as Jürgen Habermas has 
insisted (see e.g., 2001a), democracy—the idea of collective self-legislation, that all affected 
by decisions bearing in any significant way on their life-chances should have a voice in these 
decisions—is the only political principle upon which we can all agree on in a ‘post-
metaphysical’ age where are no longer any pre-given moral certainties, then how might we 
reach that critical point in the life of an organization where its decisions achieve a weight and 
resonance which seems to require democratic validation yet where it continues to lack 
effective democratic institutions? And how should we address that situation if it does so 
arise? More specifically, given that the growth of the EU over its first half century means that 
it palpably and increasingly does make decisions that significantly bear upon the life-chances 
of its members, how do we explain and how should we address any institutional shortfall in 
its democratic arrangements? This is, of course, the hoary old problem of the EU’s so-called 
‘democratic deficit’. 
 In what follows, I want to argue that the sovereignty surplus—which simply refers to 
the excess and overlapping quality of claims to sovereignty in the EU (i.e. that ultimate 
authority is claimed both for the supranational centre and for the member states) and to the 
competition over scarce legal, political and cultural capital that arise from the simultaneous 
pursuit of these claims—underscores the democratic deficit in three ways. The sovereignty 
surplus is, first of all, the deep cause of the democratic deficit. Secondly, the very gravity and 
divisiveness of what is at stake for the various parties involved and positions implicated in 
the sovereignty surplus renders the question of the proper diagnosis and treatment of the 
ensuing democratic deficit highly controversial and, indeed, sharply polarised. Thirdly and 
finally, and bringing us back to the recent constitutional controversy of the EU and its 
aftermath, the sovereignty surplus also makes the question of praxis—of how to secure the 
very ground of initiative necessary to develop and act on a more inclusively resolved 
diagnosis and treatment of the democratic deficit—whatever that may be, difficult if not 
intractable. So, to recap, with reference to the democratic deficit the sovereignty surplus is 
responsible for three aspects of the difficulty—the problem of deep causes, the problem of 
diagnostic controversy, and the problem of the eve- disappearing ground of transformative 
initiative. 
 
3. The Nature of the Democratic Deficit 
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In order to appreciate how sovereignty is the deep cause of the democratic deficit, we must 
begin by briefly defining the latter term (Follesdal and Hix, 2006). The Democratic Deficit 
can be summed up alliteratively under the five ‘A’s. 
 
3.1 Alienation—Most obviously, and notoriously, the growth of the EU involves a shift from 
nationally autonomous parliamentary power to pooled executive power at the EU level in the 
Council (of ministers) and in the European Council. This refers, then, to a two-stage 
movement—first an internal state movement from parliament to executive and, secondly, 
through the national executives acting in concert, a more general hollowing out of state 
democratic authority. 
3.2 Authority—There is a democracy-diminishing and democracy-obscuring mixture of 
different forms of authority at EU level. The Commission (bureaucratic), Court of Justice 
and, increasingly, Court of First Instance, (judicial) and Council (executive), all assume key 
responsibilities some of which might in other polities fall within the remit of directly elected 
institutions. The EU’s own such directly-elected institution, the Parliament, has only a limited 
role in legislation. It does not propose new legislation and, at the disposal stage, depending 
on the policy area in question, it is either joint-legislator or merely a consulted party. 
3.3 Attention—Few people pay attention to the European Parliament and the trend is a 
deteriorating one, with a record low turnout of 43% across the EU voting in the elections of 
2009 following a previous record low of 45% in 2005. And those who do vote continue for 
the most part to treat these occasions as ‘second order’ national elections, a fact of which the 
very modest success and salience of the European-wide political parties is both a symptom 
and a cause. 
 
3.4 Abstraction—The specific density and gravity of each individual vote may be too little 
and too light in an entity of almost 500 million people, making it the second most heavily 
populated polity with democratic pretensions or aspirations in the world (after India). 
3.5 Affinity—This refers to the so-called ‘no-demos’ problem. (Weiler, 1999, ch. 10) 
Arguably, this is the deepest, and, unarguably, it is the most complex, predicament of 
supranational democracy. The ‘no-demos’ argument comes in different variants, but in its 
fullest version it is about both the ‘inputs’ and the ‘outputs’ of democracy (Scharpf, 1999) 
and the intimate connection between these. It asserts that there is a set of social preconditions 
to democracy (see e.g. Canovan, 1996; Miller 1995) which also, crucially, happen to be 
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amongst the most important benefits (re)produced and consolidated by democracy. It further 
claims that where these preconditions and benefits are non-existent or insufficiently present, 
as is presumptively the case in the post-national EU, then we struggle to contrive them into 
existence. At sociological root, what we are talking about is the existence or otherwise of a 
minimum level of ‘we-feeling’—wherever such a feeling may come from and however it 
may be constructed—that is required in order both to be able to put in place the mechanisms 
and to enjoy the advantages associated with democracy as a system of collective decision-
making that pays equal basic concern to each of its member’s interests and preferences when 
coming to particular collective decisions. If we do not possess that threshold ‘we-feeling,’ 
then either the mechanisms of democratic decision-making will not be triggered or, even if 
they are, they are likely to remain empty promises. The relevant elements that in this ‘demos’ 
model are simultaneously dimensions of the we-feeling and benefits of democracy are four in 
number—let us then call them the ‘constituent goods’ of democracy in acknowledgment of 
their dual aspect as generative sources and standing features of the democratic ‘good’. First, 
without the relevant minimum sense of membership of a common political community, we 
may not afford others the kind of recognition and quality of respect consistent with treating 
them as political equals, and so may struggle to make or abide by common commitments. 
Secondly, and reciprocally, we may not trust others enough to be confident that they will 
respect and treat us as political equals, and so to abide by their binding common 
commitments. Thirdly, as an extension of this lack of mutual respect and trust, we may not be 
sufficiently invested in the idea of our long term common commitment to accept sacrifices in 
the name of some common good or the pressing particular interests of other constituencies 
within the community; we may, in other words, lack the motivation to offer or sustain 
“losers’ consent” (Anderson et al, 2005). And fourthly, we may not be confident enough of 
what we do possess or can possess in common so as to be able to make generous provision 
for and to accept means for respecting what we can also afford not to have in common, and 
which should therefore remain an area of tolerable difference. In sum, we may lack the trust, 
respect, solidarity and mutual sympathy that allow democracy to emerge and help it to work 
properly when it does emerge. 
 
4. Sovereignty Surplus: The Deep Cause of the Democratic Deficit 
 
If we turn now to the sovereignty dimension of our equation, in what sense does the surplus 
of sovereignty provide the deep cause of the democratic deficit? Sovereignty in its modern 
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sense, as we have already noted, refers to the idea of a full political and legal coincidence of 
people, territory and authority. As a framing idea of global relations, sovereign statehood, as 
we have also noted, does not require and never has required empirical perfection. That is to 
say, it does not require that authority is in fact monopolized in discrete territorial populations, 
but just that states should retain a plausible claim to be and to remain the predominant 
authority over their own territory and population in an everyday sense, as well as the ultimate 
authority in extremis, and that the logic of this arrangement be respected not only in internal 
state relations but also in the mutual exclusivity of the sovereignty claim between states 
(Walker, 2003). The development of the EU threatens both of these ideas—both the everyday 
pre-eminence of the state as the source of authority across the plenitude of policy sectors in a 
particular territory and over a particular population—call this substantive sovereignty—and 
the final claim to ultimate authority in circumstances of challenge—call this the categorical 
form of sovereignty. As the recently abandoned Constitutional Treaty would have made 
explicit in its competence catalogue, but as has in any case long been taken for granted within 
the Treaty system, the EU has shared competence over many policy sectors once 
monopolized by the states and, indeed, exclusive competence over a few key areas such as 
the common commercial policy and economic and monetary union. Accordingly, the 
substantive sovereignty of the states has long been subject to erosion. What is more, as also 
already noted, under the effective tutelage of the European Court of Justice this challenge of 
substance has from an early stage been underpinned by a more categorical challenge, through 
legal claims of supremacy and direct effect, and more generally, through its confident pursuit 
of “small-‘c’” (Walker, 2006) constitutional self-definition and self-sufficiency. In 
combination these claims question whether the states retain even last-analysis sovereignty to 
impose their will (or, indeed, to recover the competence and capacity to do so). The net effect 
of these challenges to the substance and very form of state sovereignty is that sovereignty is 
progressively understood as split and spread around in a quite unprecedented manner. It no 
longer persuasively rests only with the states considered separately. Conversely, it is not best 
conceived as merely redistributed in a mixed or multi-layered or federal ‘system’ for the 
states in combination, for that would still imply a single ‘superstate-like’ final authority for 
the system in question and an overarching principle or rule for deciding the hierarchy of 
norms within that system. In other words, it would assume that all the problems could be 
‘domesticated’ as questions of divided power contained within an unquestionably statist or 
state-like frame. Equally, however, contra the post-sovereigntists, sovereignty cannot be 
assumed to have simply disappeared in the conceptual space between these two polar 
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possibilities, transformed into a modality of legal or political power that knows no particular 
source of origin (whether state of superstate) nor boundary of jurisdiction (whether state or 
superstate); for that would fail to explain the continuing insistence and resonance of 
sovereignty-talk at these different sites. Rather, as the so-called constitutional pluralists 
would argue (see e.g. Walker, 2002; 2003, Maduro, 2003, Kumm 2005), sovereignty is more 
persuasively conceived not as redundant but as discretely located in each of these various 
overlapping polity sites, none of whom will defer to the other and so concede the 
absoluteness and exclusivity of the claim of the other, and whose relations inter se are for that 
reason finally heterarchical rather than hierarchical.4 
This new sovereignty configuration, crucially, also has reverberations beyond the 
legal realm. If the claim to autonomous polity status which announces or reflects the legal 
claim to sovereignty is split and spread between different polity sites, this means, 
presumptively at least, is that the need for democracy is also split and spread around in the 
trail of these new sites of sovereignty. But here the ‘no demos’ problem abruptly intrudes. To 
put it mildly, and in an agnostic and empirically contingent way, there can be no guarantees 
that the institutional means and cultural resources necessary for democracy will be 
sufficiently abundant and sufficiently flexible and mobile to meet the spreading need. Or to 
put it strongly and in a categorical way, just as sovereignty under the state system was based 
on a logic of exclusivity, the bonds and commitments that make democracy viable may also 
operate on the basis of a logic of exclusivity and thus become simply inconceivable at a 
plurality of levels simultaneously, and so at levels and places beyond the state. Whether in 
the mild or strong version, therefore, the surplus of sovereignty claims tends towards a deficit 
of democracy. 
 
5. Sovereignty and the Diagnostic Controversy 
 
Let us now turn to the second way in which the sovereignty surplus underpins the democratic 
deficit. This concerns how the importance and divisiveness of what is at stake in the 
diagnosis and treatment of the democratic deficit is informed and compounded by the 
                                                 
4 Clearly there are many other positions in the literature (legal and otherwise) which are similar to that of the 
constitutional pluralists inasmuch as they see an enduring tension between the various nation state centres of 
gravity and the supranational complex as a key defining feature of the EU’s power structure and relations, 
although they would not use the language of constitutional pluralism. For example, Habermas’s influential work 
on the development of a European social and constitutional identity as a counterpoint and complement to that of 
the member states fall within this category. See e.g. Habermas (2001b). 
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sovereignty surplus, and in particular, by the way in which that surplus allows different 
versions of the sovereign configuration of the EU to emerge and to compete. For we can 
identify a variety of different approaches to the democratic deficit, each of which may flow 
from different premises, and may, furthermore, lead to different conclusions as regards the 
proper allocation of sovereign power. For the sake of simplicity, we may reduce these 
approaches, some of which we have already referred to in passing, to six somewhat stylized 
variants. These can sometimes be combined, but some variants, as we will see, are also quite 
clearly incompatible and so mutually exclusive. In expounding these various positions and 
noting their strengths and vulnerabilities, we will again make use of an alliterative device, 
referring to the six ‘D’s. 
 
5.1 Denial—This is the view which cleaves to the traditional conception of state sovereignty. 
It has both an empirical and a counterfactual variant. The empirical variant holds, or more 
likely simply assumes, that nothing of much import has changed in the Westphalian grid 
system, and that, contrary to many views, even after 50 years the work of the EU remains 
mundane and—at least in high political terms—inconsequential, and so the threshold norm of 
democratic significance at the EU level has been reached barely or not at all. The 
counterfactual variant, in contrast, does not deny that the EU has been responsible for change 
of sovereignty-shifting dimensions, but does deny that anything of value would be lost in 
terms of the allocation of authority to the appropriate polity site by simply rewinding to an 
early age and divesting the EU of power sufficiently to return all democracy-engaging 
authority to the state. To the considerable extent that, despite their refusal to give due 
recognition to the impact made by the EU (in the empirical variant) or the impact that would 
be lost by the EU’s reduction or removal (in the counterfactual variant) both denial views still 
exist—as they do in the Eurosceptical strains of nationalism (see e.g. Holmes, 1998)—this is 
simply decayed or nostalgic thinking, although no less powerful for that. 
 
5.2. Delegation—This approach, which is sometimes accompanied by some measure of 
denial, holds that the problem of democratic reach and accountability can or should be taken 
care of through a mechanism of delegation—of national principal and supranational agent. 
(Moravcsik, 2005; Lindseth, 2002) But the actual institutional conditions of the EU stretch 
our sense of the plausibility of this. In particular, the paradigmatic supranational decision 
rules of unanimity and Qualified Majority Voting, the best gatekeeping argument for the 
principal-agent characterization prior to supranational initiatives, becomes the strongest 
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objection to any robust thesis of ongoing principal control after such initiatives have taken 
place, as they have now done progressively over half a century (Scharpf, 1999). 
 
 5.3. Demarcation—This is based on the idea that, whether we view it as necessary and 
inevitable or as contingent and avoidable, we can represent the democratic deficit as a virtue 
rather than a vice, since the core areas of EU’s activity are just those that we should in any 
case cordon off and insulate from democratic passions and preferences. Two major sub-
options have presented themselves here, each of which has been extremely influential in the 
history of EU integration. First, there is the ordo-liberal tradition, which asks for the basic 
structure of market-making and market-enhancing ‘four freedoms’ and competition law to be 
protected from EU-level legislative and executive interference concerned with particular 
socio-economic interests—an activity that should instead be left to member states. 
(Mestmacker, 1994) Secondly, there is the perspective which views the EU as a so-called 
‘regulatory state’ (Majone, 2005). In contrast to the ordo-liberal approach, it is recognized 
that the EU does and should get involved beyond its core market-making activity, but still not 
in key distributive questions or questions of deep value difference. Rather, the domain and 
style of ‘positive integration’ measures at the EU level should be restricted to precise matters 
of risk regulation in areas such as environmental or product standards. These should be left to 
experts and administrators concerned with protecting and finessing the Pareto-optimal 
solutions available on the basis of the general wealth enhancement of an expanded European 
market, rather than becoming the play of partisan political forces. 
While the demarcation approaches rightly remind us that not all of political decision-making 
can or should be subject to democratic will formation, they fail to the extent that they 
overstate the propensity and the capacity of the EU to stay clear of everyday distributive 
‘winner and loser’ politics that do require democratic will formation. This is most obviously 
true of the ordo-liberal tradition, which is unable to cope with any type of market-correcting 
European re-regulation in areas of socially relevant standards or processes—from food safety 
to health advertising to labour market discrimination. But it is also true of the regulatory state 
approach, to the extent that it is prepared to rely on disinterested expertise in such re-
regulation in a way that ignores two things. First, it ignores the pervasiveness of win-lose 
situations, where decisions which may be of general public good and of benefit to everyone 
(e.g. food safety, environmental protection) nevertheless create sharp secondary divisions 
between winners and losers in the cycle of production, exchange and circulation—producers 
versus consumers, workers versus capital investors, domestic versus foreign customers etc. 
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And secondly, it ignores the extent to which European-wide jurisdiction, even when not itself 
concerned with large distributive choices, can in the name of what it is primarily concerned 
with and competent over, namely market-making and regulatory forms of market-correction, 
create a decision-making gap by undermining the economic or legal capacity of states to 
undertake their own democratically responsive distributive policies (Scharpf, 1999). 
Economically, this would, for example, embrace the need for states to keep direct taxes down 
in order not to put off mobile capital investment. Legally, this would, for example, include 
the side-effects of monetary union—carried out in the name of removing market inefficiency 
born of fluctuating exchange rates—in removing domestic mechanisms for influencing 
domestic public revenue such as currency devaluation; equally, it would include the 
prohibition on grounds of competitive equality of forms of preferential or compensatory 
distributive treatment to particular constituencies such as regional or sectoral subsidies, or the 
strategic use of public procurement to favour particular constituencies, or the employment 
buffers of subsidized public sector industries. 
 
5.4 Disaggregation—Here democracy becomes an adjective rather than a noun—a mobile 
virtue of particular arrangements in domains or policy communities of discrete practical 
engagement where people have the knowledge and motivation to put things in common, 
rather than a holistic virtue of the large community of the ‘demos’. What we need, on this 
view, is not mass ballot-box democracy with its attendant large-scale and broad-brush 
preference formation, allocation and weighing, but a multiplicity of finely grained 
engagements of knowledgeable and mutually responsive constituencies aimed at providing 
context-specific optimizations of the common good. And if we look closely enough, we can 
find just such contexts in abundance in the EU across many different policy areas and 
mediated through such deliberative mechanisms as Comitology (Joerges and Neyer 1997, 
Joerges 2006) and the Open Method of Co-ordination. (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008) 
 But there is a level of analysis problem here. Democracy can indeed be 
disaggregated, and often does its best work in local micro-contexts. However, unless we are 
prepared to say that there are no mutual effects or ‘externalities’ between these discrete 
policy areas and communities which need trans-contextual evaluation; that there is and 
should be no broader conception of the public interest (distributive fairness, equal rights 
protection etc) which guides individual sectoral choices rather than merely emerging as their 
cumulative and serendipitous effect; and that underpinning these other concerns, there is 
either no need for or no threat to the constitutive public goods of trust, respect, solidarity and 
 13 
mutual tolerance in the disaggregated approach, then there is something lacking in that 
approach if taken in isolation. In particular, it is in danger of disregarding the twofold nature 
of the ‘demos’ problem we discussed earlier—that it represents a shorthand for those 
constitutive goods—equal respect, trust, solidarity and mutual tolerance—which by their 
input not only make the broader democratic framework possible, but are also among its 
greatest virtues and outputs. So the fact that we find an alternative route—or series of criss-
crossing routes in order to make democratic practice possible at disaggregated sites despite 
the absence of these constitutive goods at the input stage—only addresses one half of the 
problem. It can do nothing to cure or compensate for the absence of these constitutive goods 
as outputs of the democratic process. 
5.5 Displacement—This is the inverse of denial. If sovereignty and the sense of democratic 
authority that flows from sovereignty are fated to be unitary-in-the-last-instance, then perhaps 
we should fast-forward to EU democracy and leave behind state democracy as outmoded or, 
at least, as now subordinate. Similarly to its Eurosceptic opposite, the fact that this strong 
Eurofederalist view (see e.g. Mancini, 1998) is held implicitly much more than it is expressed 
explicitly, that it considers nothing of value to be lost by the redundancy of an autonomous 
conception of nation state polity and democracy, and that it rests on unlikely assumptions 
about the readiness of the forces of social and political transformation, does not make it any 
less powerful for that. 
 
5.6. Dualism—This is the view which holds that we need not endorse either the state-centric 
or the Euro-centric, unitary-sovereigntist view of the deniers and delegators on the one hand 
and the displacers on the other. Equally, we should not be satisfied by the democracy-
diminishing view of the demarcation approach—often itself tending towards a closet vision 
of European-centred unitary sovereignty—or by the view of the disaggregator, which tries to 
oppose a polity-monolithic logic and the ideas of holistic democracy and sovereignty which 
accompany that logic. Rather, on the dualist view, we can have a dual or multi-level 
democracy with each level holistic and demos-presupposing in its own terms. 
In principle, this promises the most attractively ‘pro-democratic’ solution to the 
problem to the extent that it does not allow democracy under emergent conditions of plural 
sovereignty to be defeated by the assumptions of the unitary sovereigntist frame—neither 
forcing it backwards into a statist mould nor fast-forwarding it into a superstatist mould, nor 
side-stepping the issue by narrowly demarcating or disaggregating democracy’s virtues at 
whichever site. Yet this approach would be of no value if it simply presented its diagnosis 
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and abstract resolution of the problem as sufficient to its attainment, so ignoring the resilience 
of the very unitary sovereigntist frame it seeks to overcome. Rather, the dualist model has to 
face up to and overcome the abiding challenges of this frame, which, in conclusion, are 
threefold. 
 
6. Sovereignty and the Blocked Polity 
 
The first is the structural challenge. Does the idea of holistic democracy—with the associated 
virtues of respect, trust, solidarity and mutual tolerance, not after all, as the state and 
superstate unitarians alike hold, simply possess a strong and perhaps exclusive ‘elective 
affinity’ with the structural idea of unitary sovereignty? The short, empirically tried and 
tested answer would be no—that federal and devolved and other pluri-national and pluri-
community systems show us many examples of the accommodation of multi-level democratic 
loyalties. Indeed, the possibility of secure communal living in a number of the federalized or 
devolved states that make up the EU itself—including the UK, Belgium and Spain—depends 
on this being so. So why should the EU system be any different, especially given the 
significant long-term institution-constructive work that has gone into developing the 
European Parliament as a support and forum for the wider level of European democracy? But 
the federal analogy rather begs the question. This is so because a key remaining difference 
lies precisely in these examples all being of state-framed systems. Accordingly, the division 
of powers and even of demos-creating cultural identities occurs within the context of a single 
last-analysis sovereignty. Is the same kind of accommodation possible in a multi-sovereign, 
territorially and jurisdictionally overlapping configuration such as the EU, which does not 
subserve to a singular discipline of internal hierarchy and system-integrity, and where 
identities and loyalties are not nested within one overall system supplying both the ordering 
mechanism and inter-cultural traditions for managing and resolving these issues? 
In turn, the scale of this first challenge refocuses a second cultural challenge. This is 
no longer about the possibility in principle of split-level holistic democratic commitments, 
but about the conduciveness of the social backdrop to the realization of that possibility. In 
particular, how do we nurture the necessary dual sense of loyalty in such unfavourable 
structural and ideological circumstances? These are circumstances often dominated, or at 
least distorted and shadowed by the contradictory extremes of unitary sovereignty and 
democracy at state and supranational level; or, in more minor key, characterized by the 
institutionalized prevalence of solutions of the demarcators and disaggregators that also tend 
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to exclude or marginalize any dualist way for robust democracy at the European level. This 
puzzle brings us, finally, to the most profound significance of the recent constitutional 
debate, and also to its protracted tribulations and uneasy aftermath. Quite apart from any of 
its particular provisions geared towards the institutional design and relations of the European 
Council, Council of Ministers, Commission and Parliament or its substantive adjustments and 
extensions of the competence of the EU, and arguably more importantly than any of these, 
the constitutional project could be seen as pursuing the very idea of “dual legitimacy” 
(Giscard D’Estaing, 2003) based on a dual democratic foundation, frame and expression, as a 
way of harnessing the sovereignty surplus to overcome the democratic deficit. Basically, the 
Constitutional Treaty sought to do this in two ways. First, at the procedural level, it supplied 
a mechanism to replace the purely intergovernmental and so resiliently state sovereigntist 
default model for considering major reform and resolving major disagreements within the 
Union. That new mechanism was the Constitutional Convention, with a membership drawn 
for the first time from EU institutions as well as national ones. Could such a broader forum 
supply a decision-making matrix in which the positions underpinning the various different 
and incompatible diagnoses and treatment of the democratic deficit problem were placed in 
mutual engagement without any one position being privileged, so removing or easing some 
of the negotiating impediments to the kind of inclusive solution represented by dualism? 
Secondly, at the expressive level, would the powerful mobilization effect of the constitutional 
process itself (in particular, the Convention phase) and the more general symbolism of 
common constitutional commitment (as opposed to mere Treaty agreement) supply an 
independent stimulus to the strengthening of holistic democracy at the secondary 
supranational level? 
In the event, such hopes ran aground upon the third and final problem of sovereignty 
surplus and a third, practical challenge to the idea of dualist democracy. Crucially, the 
present structural frame of sovereignty—and in particular the retention of the basic 
international treaty principle of the requirement of unanimous state consent or ‘common 
accord’ at the conclusive legal stage beyond the initial inclusive Constitutional Convention 
agreement—continued to provide a necessary, and so presumptively disabling, condition of 
initiative of any constitutional solution seeking to unblock the problem of democratic deficit, 
which, as we have seen, is itself largely a product of the very same structure of unitary 
sovereignty. This condition of initiative was ‘presumptively disabling’ because the bottom-
line, last-analysis requirement of state unanimity was always likely to allow the unitary state 
sovereigntist view to reassert itself. And so, indeed, it proved to be, with the referendum ‘no’ 
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votes on ratification of the final Treaty text in France and the Netherlands in the spring of 
2005 enough to undermine the whole project. Moreover, that this was followed two years 
later by the formal burial of the Constitutional Treaty and its substantive relaunch in the form 
of “not the Constitutional Treaty” (Walker, 2008) of Lisbon, itself finally implemented at the 
end of 2009, has merely served to reinforce the argument about practical impediment. For 
crucially, the new Treaty lacked both the procedural openness and the transformative 
symbolic solemnity of its Constitutional predecessor, and was successful in the hands of the 
representatives of state sovereignty precisely because it lacked just those procedural and 
symbolic elements which would have posed the greatest threat to the default power base of 
the unitary state sovereigntist position. We should not, however, set this story in too harsh a 
light. The very fact that a Constitutional project was attempted is arguably just as important 
as its failure in what it says about the changing relationship between sovereignty form and 
democratic content. The structural, cultural and practical impediments to the transformation 
of the configuration of relations of sovereignty and democracy in a dualist direction remain, 
and were significant enough to frustrate reform in the reform cycle just completed. But they 
we not so significant that they prevented the initiative from being taken in the first place, and 
indeed making significant progress. And since the combination of sovereignty surplus and 
democratic deficit that generated the pressures out of which the constitutional initiative 
emerged have not gone way, pressure may build again towards a new constitutional 
initiative—or its functional equivalent in procedurally and expressively transformative terms, 
at some point in the future. Whether, when, and on what terms such a process may begin and 
may succeed remains to be seen. It is a topic, I suspect, not just for the next few years, but for 
the second half-century of European integration. What can be said in anticipation, however, 
is that the only genuine hope for Europe to overcome its longstanding democratic deficit lies 
in the enduring attraction and potentially self-reinforcing strength of the democratic ideal 
itself. In particular, this depends upon continuing appreciation and stubborn pursuit of the 
possibility that while, as we have seen, any particular grounded system of democratic 
practice is unable to specify its own ‘who decides what’ framework conditions in a 
democratic fashion and must always rely on a prior ‘sovereign’ frame to answer this question, 
the democratic principle of self-government need not be the docile prisoner of that frame and 
can instead rise above its context. In so doing, in supranational Europe, just as we have often 
required of them and continue to ask of them elsewhere in contexts both traditional and new, 
the closely twinned notions of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘democracy’ can provide an ongoing basis 
of self-critique and an iterative force for self-transformation (Benhabib, 2006). As has often 
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been the case throughout the history of supranational Europe, the forms and outcome of that 
self-transformation cannot be entirely predictable, and may lead in unprecedented directions 
and to novel institutional arrangements to match the complex field of practices and negotiated 
regulation of a non-unitary post-hierarchical polity (see e.g. Tully, 2008, ch8; Wiener 2008). 
But we should not for that reason treat these most basic ideas of the age of political 
modernity as redundant in navigating the passage to a new age.
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